ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: Sen and interpersonal comparisons: non traditional arguments borrowed to his philosophical work
Author: Pellé Sophie


This paper analyzes non traditional arguments developed by Amartya Sen on a crucial issue for justice: interpersonal comparisons of “welfare”. Sen denounced the inability of traditional welfare economics and social choice theory to take into account problems raised by distributive matters because of their refusal to integrate interpersonal comparisons. As it is well-known, Sen proposed first, to reintroduce those comparisons and second, to modify the informational basis into which they were to be done, thus moving from “utility” to “capability” (1979, 1985, 1993). Moreover, he proposed (1970) a formal solution that allowed every sort of comparisons in between full comparability and non comparability. In addition to this formal possibility for interpersonal comparisons, it is possible to use some of Sen’s philosophical developments to justify then interpersonal comparisons. The arguments are of two kinds. The first one was developed in a 1967 article that tries to solve the epistemological conflict that forbids value judgment in economics. The second one refers to the concept of “positional objectivity” first discussed in opposition with Thomas Nagel. Even if these arguments are not explicitly used by Sen to prove the necessity of introducing interpersonal comparisons the paper should demonstrate that they are rather convenient to this issue.

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